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Abstract 
While future imagination is largely considered to be a cognitive process grounded in default 
mode network activity, studies have shown that future imagination recruits regions in both 
default mode and frontoparietal control networks. In addition, it has recently been shown that 
the ability to imagine the future is associated with cognitive flexibility, and that tasks 
requiring cognitive flexibility result in increased coupling of the default mode network with 
frontoparietal control and salience networks. In the current study, we investigated the neural 
correlates underlying the association between cognitive flexibility and future imagination in 
two ways. First, we experimentally varied the degree of cognitive flexibility required during 
future imagination by manipulating the disparateness of episodic details contributing to 
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imagined events. To this end, participants generated episodic details (persons, locations, 
objects) within three social spheres; during fMRI scanning they were presented with sets of 
three episodic details all taken from the same social sphere (Congruent condition) or different 
social spheres (Incongruent condition) and required to imagine a future event involving the 
three details. We predicted that, relative to the Congruent condition, future simulation in the 
Incongruent condition would be associated with increased activity in regions of the default 
mode, frontoparietal and salience networks. Second, we hypothesized that individual 
differences in cognitive flexibility, as measured by performance on the Alternate Uses Task, 
would correspond to individual differences in the brain regions recruited during future 
imagination. A task partial least squares (PLS) analysis showed that the Incongruent 
condition resulted in an increase in activity in regions in salience networks (e.g. the insula) 
but, contrary to our prediction, reduced activity in many regions of the default mode network 
(including the hippocampus). A subsequent functional connectivity (within-subject seed PLS) 
analysis showed that the insula exhibited increased coupling with default mode regions 
during the Incongruent condition. Finally, a behavioral PLS analysis showed that individual 
differences in cognitive flexibility were associated with differences in activity in a number of 
regions from frontoparietal, salience and default-mode networks during both future 
imagination conditions, further highlighting that the cognitive flexibility underlying future 
imagination is grounded in the complex interaction of regions in these networks.  
Keywords: autobiographical memory; cognitive flexibility; default mode network; divergent 
thinking; episodic simulation; frontoparietal control network; future thinking; salience 
network. 
 
1. Introduction  
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Much recent research has focused on the notion that the brain is a fundamentally 
prospective organ (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), using information gleaned from the 
present environment and past memories to generate predictions about the future. Indeed, 
much of our time is consumed by various types of future-oriented thoughts that range in their 
depth and flexibility (Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). Like many species, humans can 
enlist inflexible reproductions of memorized or instinctual behaviors in a future-directed 
fashion (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Humans, however, can also construct mental 
simulations of novel future events in sufficient detail to support effective planning (Buckner 
& Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2012; Schacter & 
Addis, 2007). In fact, it is likely that the ability to simulate experiences beyond the immediate 
present environment underlies the human capacity to respond flexibly to unexpected changes 
in the environment (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
The constructive nature of the episodic memory system (Bartlett, 1932; Schacter, 
Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998) makes it well-suited to support the construction of novel 
simulations. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 
2007), the storage of episodic memories as a pattern of features distributed across the cortex 
(Damasio, 1989; Schacter et al., 1998; Squire, 1992) facilitates the extraction of episodic 
details—such as familiar people, places and objects—as content for simulations. Support for 
the idea that access to episodic memory is required for simulation comes from neuroimaging 
studies reporting that both memory and simulation engage a core network of regions 
overlapping substantially with the default mode network (DMN; Benoit & Schacter, 2015; 
Schacter et al., 2012; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007) as well as patient studies 
documenting corresponding deficits in episodic memory and simulation (Addis, Sacchetti, 
Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Andelman, Hoofien, 
Goldberg, Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, 
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Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Kwan, Carson, Addis, & Rosenbaum, 2010; but see also Squire et 
al., 2010). In addition to episodic memory, semantic memory also plays a critical role in 
future simulation, providing a scaffold for event representations (Irish & Piguet, 2013). 
Indeed, without access to semantic memory, future simulation is impaired (Duval et al., 2012; 
Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Viard et al., 2014), and interestingly the network 
associated with semantic memory overlaps considerably with the DMN (Binder & Desai, 
2011; Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Burianova, McIntosh, & Grady, 2010) further 
suggesting a critical interplay between these systems during simulation. 
According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, extracted episodic 
details must also be recombined into a coherent event simulation. This recombinatory ability 
is thought to be central to flexibly imagining the future – to construct as well as disassemble 
and rework the components of scenarios to create different outcomes to enhance future 
behavior (Addis, Pan, Musicaro, & Schacter, 2016; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Despite this 
theoretical importance, little is known about the recombination process, including its neural 
correlates. Much of the existing evidence rests on neuroimaging reports of increased activity 
during the simulation of future events relative to remembering past events (e.g., Addis, 
Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2010; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Benoit & Schacter, 
2015). Increased activity for future imagination relative to remembering the past has been 
interpreted as reflecting the recombination of episodic details into a coherent scenario 
because, by definition, the details comprising a novel event are less congruent than the details 
previously bound into a past event, and thus should impose higher demands on recombinatory 
processes. Regions across the DMN have been reported as exhibiting such effects, including 
frontopolar/dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral temporal and parietal 
cortex, precuneus, posterior cingulate, and hippocampus (Abraham, Schubotz, & von 
Cramon, 2008; Addis et al., 2010, 2007; Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Gilmore, 
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Nelson, & McDermott, 2016; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Viard et al., 2011; for a 
meta-analysis, see Benoit & Schacter, 2015) 
The hippocampus has been a focus in the study of recombination during simulation – 
perhaps unsurprising given the established role of this structure in relational processing, 
including the binding together of disparate elements during working memory as well as 
episodic encoding and retrieval (Axmacher et al., 2010; Eichenbaum, 2001; Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2008; Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006; Staresina & Davachi, 2009). Indeed, the 
simulations generated by hippocampal amnesics are not only sparse in episodic detail but also 
less coherent than those of healthy controls (Hassabis et al., 2007). Hippocampal amnesics 
are diminished in their ability to imagine future events that draw heavily on semantic 
information (e.g. the presidential election in 2032), suggesting the hippocampus may also 
play a role in the binding together of semantic details to produce complex semantic 
representations (Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013). Moreover, simulation-related 
hippocampal activity is greatest when constructing future events for the first time (Gaesser, 
Spreng, McLelland, Addis, & Schacter, 2013; van Mulukom, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 
2013), particularly when these events are specific in nature (Addis et al., 2010) and comprise 
greater amounts of detail (Addis & Schacter, 2008; Madore, Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 
2016). These construction effects are evident even when controlling other possible 
determinants of hippocampal activity such as event novelty (Gaesser et al., 2013) and 
encoding (Martin, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2011; for additional discussion see Schacter, 
Addis, & Szpunar, in press). Interestingly,  Weiler, Suchan, & Daum (2010) found that 
simulating less probable events (that likely involve more incongruent combinations of 
details) engages the hippocampus more than commonplace, high probability events, although 
the disparateness of details was not directly measured. 
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This evidence, however, is limited in that these studies provide only indirect support 
of the recombination process; as yet, the effects of explicitly modulating recombinatory 
demands on simulation-related brain activity have not been investigated directly. Moreover, 
the focus on the hippocampus has been at the expense of characterizing recombination effects 
in other DMN regions. Thus, the current study is the first to experimentally manipulate the 
disparateness of details comprising future simulations, thereby directly testing this 
hypothesized function of the hippocampus and exploring the effects on extra-hippocampal 
regions during future simulation. 
In addition to recombinatory processes, we propose that successfully organizing 
disparate elements into a coherent scenario places demands on other domain-general 
processes supported by networks outside of the DMN. One such process is spontaneous 
cognitive flexibility (Eslinger & Grattan, 1993) which refers specifically to the ability to 
spontaneously generate a diversity of ideas (in contrast to reactive cognitive flexibility – the 
ability to shift mental set in response to changing environmental demands). Spontaneous 
cognitive flexibility (referred to hereafter as cognitive flexibility) involves the ability to 
“break conventional or obvious patterns of thinking” (Dietrich, 2004, p.1014) in the service 
of generating novel ideas, and as such can be indexed by divergent thinking1 measures 
(Eslinger & Grattan, 1993; Tomer, Fisher, Giladi, & Aharon-Peretz, 2002), such as the 
flexibility measure of the Alternate Uses Task (AUT; Guilford, 1967). Indeed, this domain-
general ability supports many forms of creative processing, including music, poetry and, 
relevant here, imagination (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016). Consistent with the 
notion that cognitive flexibility is important for recombining disparate details during 
simulation, Addis, Pan, Musicaro, & Schacter (2016) found that the amount of episodic detail 
                                                          
1
 While divergent thinking is often defined as synonymous with “creativity”, in of itself, it is just one component 
of the creative thinking faculty, along with convergent thinking, working memory, sustained attention, etc. 
(Dietrich, 2004). 
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comprising future simulations was positively associated with divergent thinking as measured 
by the AUT.  
It is important to note that although divergent thinking has been linked with the DMN, 
in particular the temporal pole and hippocampus (e.g. Benedek, Jauk, Fink, et al., 2014; 
Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012; Takeuchi et al., 2011) this activity reflects the 
associative component of the task and is distinct from the executive component of the task – 
namely, cognitive flexibility – that is grounded in frontoparietal control network (FPCN) 
activity, especially lateral frontopolar cortex, including the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, 2014; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & 
Wynn, 2007; Niendam et al., 2012). Indeed, FPCN is particularly active during tasks that 
require cognitive flexibility and consistent with its domain-general role, the FPCN influences 
the activation of other task-specific networks (Cole et al., 2013). For instance, Beaty, 
Benedek, Kaufman, and Silvia (2015) found that FPCN regions (e.g., rostrolateral and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) were functionally coupled with DMN regions during a 
divergent thinking task; moreover, the insula (part of the salience network, SN) was also 
coupled with the DMN in the early stages of the task, likely supporting the switching between 
large-scale networks (Menon & Uddin, 2010). In addition, the same study showed that more 
cognitively flexible individuals (i.e. those with the most creative responses in the AUT) 
exhibited increased coherence between FPCN and DMN regions. Additionally, it has been 
shown that during flexible future planning, the FPCN couples with DMN regions (Spreng, 
Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010), supporting the top-down evaluation and 
modification of self-generated ideas to meet task-specific goals (Beaty et al., 2016).  
Interestingly, in a recent meta-analysis of activation during future simulation, Benoit 
& Schacter (2015) report five clusters falling within the boundaries of the FCPN that exhibit 
greater activity when imagining the future relative to remembering the past. Thus, while it is 
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clear that the FPCN is often recruited during future simulation, whether this is related to the 
degree of cognitive flexibility required by the simulation task remains unknown. We explored 
this question in two ways. First, our manipulation of detail disparateness should affect not 
only the demands placed on recombinatory process but also on cognitive flexibility. 
Specifically, recombining incongruent details in a meaningful way requires more cognitive 
flexibility than integrating congruent details, and thus under those task demands we expect to 
see not only activation the DMN, but also the FPCN (and the SN, supporting switching 
between these networks), as well as increased functional connectivity between these 
networks. Second, we investigated whether individual differences in cognitive flexibility (as 
indexed by divergent thinking) are related to brain activity while individuals are imagining 
the future. 
 To this end, we used a recently-developed version of the experimental recombination 
paradigm in which the disparateness of memory details to be incorporated into each imagined 
scenario was directly manipulated (van Mulukom, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2016). 
Specifically, prior to scanning, participants generated lists of people, places and objects 
associated with distinct social spheres in their own lives (e.g., work, home, sports team). The 
key premise underlying this manipulation is that details from the same sphere (e.g., Brother, 
Nanna’s House, Dad’s car) are more congruent and more easily recombined into a scenario 
than are details from different spheres (e.g., Mum, Prof. Tulving’s office, soccer ball). 
Participants’ ratings on this task confirm that the social sphere manipulation affects the 
disparateness of details: within-sphere (congruent) details are rated as more likely to co-occur 
in everyday life than across-sphere (incongruent) details. Thus, unlike previous versions of 
the recombination paradigm where random sets of episodic details are presented during 
scanning (Addis, Pan, et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2011), in the current study participants were 
presented with congruent and incongruent sets of episodic details to incorporate into their 
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future simulations; by experimentally manipulating the disparateness of the details to be 
included in an imagined scenario, we modulated the degree to which recombinatory and 
cognitive flexibility processes were required during future simulation. We also collected data 
on dimensions that potentially affect the intensity of simulation-related brain activity (i.e., 
encoding, detail, plausibility, novelty, difficulty) to enable us to isolate activation related to 
integration of disparate details.  
We predicted that constructing future simulations from disparate details (Incongruent 
condition) would be associated with (1) increased activation of the DMN, including the 
hippocampus, reflecting increased recombinatory demands; (2) increased recruitment of the 
FPCN and SN, reflecting the executive functions underlying domain-general cognitive 
flexibility and (3) increased functional connectivity between SN, FPCN and DMN regions. 
Moreover, we investigated whether individual differences in cognitive flexibility (as indexed 
by the flexibility measure of the AUT) were related to activity in regions of both the DMN 
and FPCN while individuals are imagining the future. We predicted that such brain-behavior 
relationships would be stronger in the Incongruent condition, as this condition should draw 
more heavily on associative processing (subserved by DMN regions) and executive function 
(FPCN regions) than the Congruent condition, and previous work has shown cognitive 
flexibility to be related to both associative and executive processing (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, 
Jauk, & Benedek, 2014). 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Twenty-five healthy young adults with no history of neurological or psychiatric 
conditions participated in this study, providing informed written consent in a manner 
approved by the University of Auckland Human Ethics Committee. All participants were 
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fluent in English and right-handed (as determined using the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory; Oldfield, 1971). Data from two participants were excluded because they were 
unable to complete the fMRI scan, and one due to task non-compliance during the post-scan 
interview. Thus, data from 22 individuals (7 males; Mage=21.2, SDage=3.74) were included in 
the analyses. 
2.2 Tasks  
2.2.1 Alternate Uses Task (AUT).  
Divergent thinking was measured using the AUT (Guilford, 1967). On each of six 
trials, participants were required to generate as many alternate uses as possible for the given 
object (brick, button, automobile tyre, key, pencil, and paperclip). Each trial was three 
minutes in duration; at the two minute mark, participants were alerted that they had one 
minute remaining. Participant responses were recorded, transcribed and scored for 
flexibility—the number of distinct categories their responses for an item could be grouped 
into—by two independent coders. For example, on the trial paperclip, the responses ‘to make 
a bracelet’, ‘to make a ring’, and ‘to make earrings’ would all be grouped together in one 
category, and the response ‘to use as mini rodent ice skates’ in another, resulting in a 
flexibility score of 2. For each participant, the total flexibility score summed across the six 
trials was used for analysis. Two independent raters scored all responses; a two-way mixed 
model confirmed a high degree of inter-rater reliability (standardized Cronbach’s alpha = 
.97). 
2.2.2 Future Simulation fMRI Task.  
During a pre-scan session, participants were asked to identify three distinct social 
spheres (e.g. university, work, family etc.) For each sphere, they provided a list of 40 persons, 
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locations and objects encountered within the last 5 years. No detail could be duplicated across 
spheres, and any person that the participant indicated could be placed into more than one 
sphere was removed. Each detail was then rated for familiarity (0=only encountered once; 
3=as familiar as a parent or spouse) and frequency of encounter (0=encountered annually; 
1=monthly; 2=weekly, 3=daily). The person, location and object details were then used to 
create 45 person/place/object detail sets for each of two conditions: (1) Congruent, where the 
3 details comprising a detail set were from the same sphere; and (2) Incongruent, where each 
detail comprising a detail set came from a different sphere. Mean familiarity and frequency of 
encounter ratings of details comprising congruent and incongruent sets were matched across 
the two conditions (familiarity: t21 = .27, p = .793; frequency of encounter; t21 = .54, p = 
.598).  
For each future simulation trial during scanning, participants were presented with a 
detail set on the screen (i.e., three words that corresponded to a person, location and object) 
from the Congruent or Incongruent condition (10 s); the order in which the person, place and 
object details were presented was counterbalanced across trials. Participants were instructed 
to imagine, from a field perspective (i.e., “through their own eyes”), a specific future event 
that could occur within the next 5 years that incorporated the three details. Once they had an 
event in mind, participants made a button press and then elaborated the event for the 
remainder of the trial. Each trial was followed by a rating scale (4 s) for the amount of detail 
comprising the simulation (0 = little or no detail, 3 = vivid detail).  
Immediately following the scan, participants completed a post-scan session in two 
parts. First, to measure degree of encoding of simulations generated during scanning, 
participants completed a cued-recall test for detail sets shown in the future task (Martin et al., 
2011); for each set, two details were presented and they had to recall the third missing detail. 
The test was self-paced and the type of detail to be recalled (person, location, object) was 
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counterbalanced across trials. Second, participants were presented with each complete detail 
set and asked to briefly describe the future event they had generated during the scanner. This 
description was used to confirm that the event was future-oriented, self-relevant (i.e., they 
imagined themselves in the event) and specific in time and place; any trials for which this 
was not the case were dropped from further analyses. Participants provided an estimated date 
for each future event (in years). They also rated the plausibility of the event (0 = very 
implausible; 3 = very plausible), its novelty assessed by rating the similarity of the event to 
previously experienced or imagined events (0 = not at all similar; 3 = very similar) and how 
difficult it was to construct the simulation (0 = not at all difficult; 3 = very difficult). To 
confirm our manipulation of detail disparateness, participants rated each detail set for how 
likely the three details would be to co-occur in everyday life (0 = not at all likely; 3 = very 
likely).  
2.2.3 Control fMRI Task.  
The scanning session also included 45 trials of a sentence construction control task 
that involved retrieval of semantic information and visual imagery (Addis, Pan, et al., 2009). 
A list of 27 highly familiar (M = 5.48, SD = 1.01), imageable (M = 6.44, SD = 0.27) and 
concrete (M = 6.94, SD = 0.06) nouns was compiled from the Clark and Paivio (2004) 
extended norms. For each trial, three nouns were randomly selected from this list and 
presented (10 s). Participants made a size judgement by generating a sentence in the form of 
‘X is bigger than Y, which is bigger than Z’ (e.g. ‘car is bigger than bag, which is bigger than 
phone’). Once constructed, they made a button press and focused on the semantic definition 
of each noun for the remaining time. Participants then rated the difficulty they had 
constructing the sentence (0 = very easy, 3 = very difficult; 4 s). 
2.3 Scanning Session 
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Participants completed 7 practice trials (4 simulation trials and 3 control trials) outside 
of the scanner; participants were ask to describe the simulations they generated on these trials 
to confirm they understood the task instructions (i.e., that they were imagining future 
scenarios that involved themselves and doing so from a field perspective).  
Participants completed five runs of functional scanning, each 482 s in duration. Each 
run comprised 18 future simulation trials (half Congruent and half Incongruent) and 9 control 
trials. Null trials (fixation cross) comprised 22% (104 s) of each run. The randomized order 
of all trials, and the jittered duration of null trials, was determined using Optseq 2.0 (Dale, 
1999).  
2.3.1 MRI Acquisition Parameters. 
 MRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens MAGNETOM Skyra scanner. Anatomical 
scans were acquired using a magnetization prepared rapidly acquired gradient echo (MP-
RAGE) sequence. Whole-brain functional scans were acquired using a T2*-weighted echo 
planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 3000 ms, TE = 27 ms, FOV = 225 mm, flip angle = 
90°) with 59 coronal-oblique slices (3.5 mm) acquired in an interleaved fashion at an angle 
perpendicular to the long axis of the hippocampus. Field maps were acquired using Siemens 
standard double-echo field map sequence (TR = 577ms; TE = 4.92 and 7.38ms). Task stimuli 
(black text on white background) were projected onto a mirror incorporated into the 20-
channel head coil. E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, P.A.) was 
used for timed presentation of stimuli and collection of participants responses made via a 4-
button MR-compatible response box. 
2.4 Procedure 
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Participants completed three sessions, spaced approximately one week apart. During 
Session 1, participants provided person, location and object details for the future simulation 
tasks. During Session 2, participants completed the AUT. During Session 3, participants 
completed the scanning session and post-scan interview.   
2.5 Data Analysis 
2.5.1 Trial Selection.  
Any trials on which no response was recorded or response times were less than 500ms 
were excluded from further analysis. In addition, any future trials for which no specific event 
could be described during the post-scan interview were excluded. 
2.5.2. Behavioral Analyses.  
Paired t-tests and analyses of variance (ANOVA) were used as appropriate to assess 
effects of condition on behavioral measures. For ANOVAs, if the assumption of sphericity 
was violated (ԑ <.90), a correction factor to account for the inflation in Type I error rate was 
applied to the degrees of freedom of the F-distribution (Geisser & Greenhouse, 1958). 
Pearson correlations were performed between AUT flexibility scores and Incongruent-
Congruent difference scores for the following behavioral measures: construction response 
time, subsequent memory (proportion correct), and subjective ratings (difficulty, plausibility, 
detail and novelty). We used difference scores due to the subjective nature of the ratings; if 
different participants use the rating scales differently, it could obscure any relationships 
between the AUT flexibility scores and the behavioral ratings, rendering the results difficult 
to interpret. However, any given participant is unlikely to use the rating scale differently for 
the Congruent and Incongruent conditions, rendering difference scores as most appropriate 
for this analysis. We predicted that highly flexible individuals will show less of a Congruent-
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Incongruent difference in subjective ratings conditions (i.e., a negative relationship between 
behavioral difference scores and flexibility scores). For example, relative to someone low in 
cognitive flexibility, a highly flexible individual is predicted to experience a smaller shift in 
difficulty (or any of the dimensions) between the Congruent and Incongruent conditions. 
2.5.3 Preprocessing.  
The first four images from each run were discarded to allow the longitudinal 
magnetization to reach equilibrium. Functional images were preprocessed using SPM8 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). Preprocessing included slice-time 
correction, correction for motion and distortion (using SPM8’s Realign and Unwarp routine 
together with the Field Map toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002), co-registration with the anatomical 
scan, spatial normalization using parameters derived during segmentation to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) template (resampled at 2×2×2 mm voxels) and spatial 
smoothing (8mm full-width half maximum Gaussian kernel). 
2.5.4 Spatiotemporal Partial Least Squares (ST-PLS).  
Event-related functional data were analyzed using a ST-PLS approach, a multivariate 
approach used extensively in studies on autobiographical memory and future simulation (e.g. 
Addis, McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Addis, Roberts, & Schacter, 
2011; Addis, Pan, et al., 2009; Burianova & Grady, 2007; Burianova et al., 2010; Martin et 
al., 2011; Spreng & Grady, 2010). Partial least squares (PLS) offers more power than 
univariate approaches; unlike univariate approaches where a separate statistical analysis is 
computed at every voxel, PLS is a multivariate technique and so all voxels are included one 
analysis. Therefore, a correction for multiple comparisons is not required. It also makes no 
assumptions about the shape and time course of the hemodynamic response function (HRF).  
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2.5.4.1 Task PLS Analyses.  
Data were analyzed using non-rotated task ST-PLS analyses over a temporal window 
of 5 TRs (15 s). A data matrix comprising blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal 
from all participants and all voxels (within a custom-made gray matter mask derived by 
segmenting an MNI brain and binarizing the resulting gray matter image) for specified 
conditions at each TR in this temporal window was constructed; for each trial, BOLD signal 
data from TRs in the temporal window were normalized relative to the signal at the onset of 
the trial. The data matrix was cross-correlated with the design matrix (comprising vectors 
specifying a priori contrasts of conditions). The resultant cross-product matrix underwent 
singular value decomposition, producing latent variables comprised of: (i) a singular value 
indicating the amount of covariance for which the LV accounts; (ii) a linear contrast across 
conditions that codes for the effect depicted by voxels; and (iii) a singular image of voxel 
weights (“saliences”) that indicates the voxels exhibiting the greatest covariance with the 
linear contrast during each TR. The weighted value of a salience can be either positive or 
negative, depending on its relation to the specified contrast of conditions. Brain scores (a 
weighted average of all voxel saliences associated with a condition) were also derived for 
each participant in each condition, specifying how strongly the spatiotemporal brain pattern 
for a given LV is expressed by that participant.  
The overall statistical significance of each LV was determined using permutation 
testing (1000 permutations). For each permutation, all participants’ data were reassigned to 
conditions, the ST-PLS was re-run and a new singular value obtained. Significance indicated 
the probability of the number of times the singular value from the permuted data exceeded 
the actual singular value (McIntosh, Bookstein, Haxby, & Grady, 1996); a threshold of p < 
.05 was used. Note that because PLS is a multivariate technique, all voxels are included in the 
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same analysis and thus because only one analysis is computed, the need to correct for 
multiple comparisons is obviated2.    
Bootstrapping estimation of the standard error (SE) was used to determine the 
reliability of voxel saliences; participants were randomly resampled with replacement, the 
ST-PLS was re-run and the saliences computed. After this procedure was completed 1000 
times, the SE of the saliences was computed. Voxels in which bootstrap ratios were greater 
than ±3.00 (roughly equivalent to p <.001) were considered to represent reliable voxels; only 
clusters of 10 or more voxels are presented for brevity. Confidence intervals for brain scores 
(which are based on saliences) were also calculated using this procedure. Examination of 
95% confidence intervals around brain scores provides an indication of whether a condition 
reliably contributes to the spatiotemporal pattern associated with the contrast (as indicated by 
confidence intervals that do not include zero) and whether the conditions contributed 
differentially to the pattern (as indicated by non-overlapping confidence intervals).   
As is common practice in studies using event-related PLS (e.g., Addis et al., 2004, 
2011; Hirshhorn, Grady, Rosenbaum, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2012), we report results from 
TRs in which the effects were maximal (i.e., the TRs at which the spatial pattern comprised 
the greatest number of voxels); focusing on maximal TRs has the benefit of brevity while still 
providing critical insights into the spatial patterns and temporal trajectories associated with 
the conditions. The MNI co-ordinates of the peak voxels within each cluster were localized 
using Harvard-Oxford Atlases (Desikan et al., 2006). In addition, each cluster was localized 
to functional networks by determining each cluster’s degree of overlap with the seven 
network cortical parcellation of (Yeo et al., 2011; available from 
https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/fswiki/CorticalParcellation_Yeo2011), allowing us to 
                                                          
2
 In contrast to the multivariate approach where data from all voxels are included in the same analysis, the 
univariate approach requires multiple statistical analyses be computed (one at each voxel), thus requiring a 
correction for multiple comparisons. 
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determine which clusters belonged to the DMN, FPCN and SN. For illustrative purposes, 
singular images were overlaid on the MNI ICBM 152 nonlinear anatomical template image 
(Fonov et al., 2011) and percent signal change values from the peak voxels of clusters in the 
DMN, FPCN and SN were extracted and plotted for illustrative purposes. 
Using the above-described ST-PLS procedure, we ran a series of analyses; for each, 
the relevant a priori contrast of conditions was specified.  (1) The first analysis contrasted the 
two future conditions relative to the control task as a data quality check; as the results 
replicated previous findings (i.e., significant activation of the default mode network during 
future simulation), these result are not discussed any further. (2) The second analysis 
contrasted Congruent and Incongruent future events to test our main hypotheses. However, as 
the two conditions differed along a range of phenomenological dimensions (detail, 
plausibility, novelty, difficulty) and on levels of encoding (i.e., performance on the cued-
recall test; see Section 3.1), it could be the case that any activation differences between the 
Congruent and Incongruent conditions simply reflected differences in these behavioral 
dimensions rather than the experimental manipulation per se. To determine which clusters of 
activation were affected by these behavioral variables, we computed Analysis 2 five times, 
each time using functional data that had been residualized for the effect of one of these 
covariates (detail ratings, plausibility ratings, novelty ratings, difficulty ratings, encoding 
success - proportion correct) as described below (Section 2.5.4.2). Thus, we restricted our 
reporting of Analysis 2 to only those clusters that were evident in each of the five analyses 
using residualized data. 
2.5.4.2 Residualization Procedure for Task PLS.  
Because the Congruent and Incongruent conditions differ on a number of behavioral 
dimensions that could influence relevant brain activity, we developed a residualization 
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procedure for task PLS analyses to correct the BOLD data for these differences. Specifically, 
we removed variance that was shared by (i) Congruent-Incongruent differences in behavioral 
scores, AND (ii) Congruent-Incongruent differences in BOLD signal (Wiebels, Roberts, & 
Addis, 2016). We could have opted to run the residualization procedure separately for each 
condition, but controlling for behavior within each condition separately is confounded by 
between-subject variability associated with both behavioral responses and the BOLD signal. 
In the current study, a potential source of between-subject variability in the behavioral data is 
the use of subjective rating scales that can be interpreted differently by different participants. 
Importantly, however, any given participant is unlikely to use a rating scale differently across 
conditions. Likewise, some of the between-subject variance in the amplitude of the BOLD 
signal is likely to derive from sources that vary across participants but are unrelated to the 
experimental conditions (e.g., physiological factors; Dubois & Adolphs, 2016).  
Thus, based on the logic of repeated-measures ANOVA (where between-subject 
variance is removed from the error term), we used Congruent-Incongruent difference scores 
so as not to confound our residualization with between-subject variability. We reasoned that 
if a Congruent-Incongruent activation difference is driven by a difference in behavior 
between the two conditions, there should be a linear across-subject relationship between these 
two sets of difference scores. For example, if the plausibility of simulated events is driving 
BOLD activity in a region, it should be the case that individuals with greater differences in 
plausibility ratings between the two conditions should also exhibit greater differences in 
BOLD activation between the conditions. Importantly, simply regressing out the effects of 
behavior for each condition separately does not necessarily remove the shared variance 
associated with a linear relationship between BOLD and behavior difference scores (see 
Supplementary Materials, Section S1, for a more detailed explanation of this point).  
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To regress out the behavioral differences from differences in fMRI data, difference 
scores were calculated for each TR at each voxel for each subject, creating vectors of 
difference scores (Eq. 1). Likewise, difference scores were calculated for the following 
behavioral scores: detail, plausibility, difficulty, novelty and encoding (Eq. 2).  
    ⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗            ⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                 ⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                  (Eq.1) 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗           ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗               (Eq.2) 
Separately, each behavioral difference score was regressed out of the BOLD differences, 
resulting in a difference between Congruent and Incongruent for each voxel at each TR that 
was independent of any differences in behavioral scores between the two conditions (Eq. 3).  
    ⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗              I -      ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗    *       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗    
 
*      ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗     
   *     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗    
 
) *     ⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                 (Eq.3) 
* I = identity matrix; p = intercept of regression line; T = transposed 
Next, these residualized difference scores were projected back onto the original data matrix 
by subtracting them from the original percent signal change values in the Congruent 
condition (Eq. 4). This created a new set of percent signal change values for the Incongruent 
condition, by replacing the original difference between the two conditions with a difference 
that showed no relationship to the difference between the conditions on a given behavioral 
score. For a graphical description of this process, please see Supplementary Materials 
(Section S2).  
                                                       (Eq.4) 
 
2.5.4.3 Seed PLS Analyses.  
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To further explore the results of the Incongruent-Congruent Task PLS analysis, we 
assessed the functional connectivity of regions of interest within the FPCN and SN (i.e., 
FPCN: dorsolateral and rostrolateral prefrontal cortex; SN: insula, anterior cingulate cortex; 
Beaty et al., 2015) with the DMN, with the hypothesis that these regions reflecting domain-
general cognitive flexibility will be more strongly coupled with the DMN during the 
Incongruent condition. Task-related functional connectivity was assessed for any regions of 
interest that were evident in the results of the Incongruent>Congruent task PLS analysis. To 
this end, we computed task-related functional connectivity using a novel version of seed PLS 
which we call within-subjects seed PLS (ws-seed PLS) that assesses temporal, within-subject 
correlations between a seed region and the rest of the brain (Roberts, Hach, Tippett, & Addis, 
2016)3. Briefly, ws-seed PLS involves calculating the mean BOLD signal for each trial in 
each voxel, thereby creating a vector of BOLD signal values for each voxel in each condition. 
This is similar to the beta-series correlation approach (Rissman, Gazzaley, & D’Esposito, 
2004), except that the “series” are BOLD percent signal change values and not beta values 
derived from the general linear model. For each future simulation condition, these vectors 
were then correlated with the vector of BOLD signal values from the seed region (a 6mm 
cube comprising 27 voxels centered on the peak voxel in the left insula, xyz -38 4 14), 
creating a within-subject correlation coefficient for each voxel of the brain specifying the 
strength and direction of the temporal correlation of each voxel with the seed region. These 
seed-brain correlation coefficients were then submitted to a singular value decomposition to 
produce latent variables specifying task-related differences and similarities in functional 
connectivity between the seed and the rest of the brain.  Permutation testing and 
bootstrapping procedures were conducted as described above in Section 2.5.4.1, and results 
                                                          
3
 Standard seed PLS analyses involves taking voxels’ mean percent signal change values and performing 
atemporal, across-subject correlations between the seed and the rest of the brain. As we have shown (Roberts, 
Hach, Tippett, & Addis, 2016), within- and across-subject correlations of BOLD data often produce different 
findings, meaning that standard seed PLS results are not necessarily informative of the temporal interaction 
between brain regions. 
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were thresholded using a BSR of ±3.00 (roughly equivalent to p < .001) and a spatial extent 
threshold of 10 voxels.  
2.5.4.4 Behavior PLS.  
To identify regions in which task-related activity correlated with divergent thinking, a 
behavior PLS analysis on BOLD data from the two future simulation tasks was conducted. 
Specifically, for each task, BOLD signal from every voxel was correlated with a vector 
containing AUT flexibility scores in an across-subject fashion. These brain-behavior 
correlation coefficients were then submitted to a singular value decomposition, producing 
latent variables specifying task-related differences and similarities in correlations between 
activity and AUT flexibility scores. Permutation testing and bootstrapping procedures were 
conducted as described above in Section 2.5.4.1, and results were thresholded using a BSR of 
±3.00 (roughly equivalent to p < .001) and a spatial extent threshold of 10 voxels.  
3. Results 
3.1 Behavioral Results 
The number of trials and response time (RT) data for all conditions, and the 
phenomenological measures for the two future simulation conditions, are presented in Table 
1. For all conditions, only trials on which a RT was recorded or with RTs greater than 500ms 
were analyzed. An average of 1.64 and 2.82 trials per participant were excluded for the 
Congruent and Incongruent conditions respectively on this basis. For simulation trials, 
analysis was further restricted to include only those trials for which a specific event was 
recounted during the post-scan interview. The resulting bin sizes differed by condition 
(F1.29,27.14=29.35, p<.001, η
2
 = .59): there were more trials in the control condition than the 
future conditions (p values < .001), and the Congruent condition had more trials than the 
Incongruent condition (p < .001).  
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An ANOVA on RT data resulted in a main effect of condition (F1.14,23.99=32.39, 
p<.001, η2 = .61). Pairwise comparisons indicated that average RTs were faster in the control 
relative to future conditions (p values < .001). Although RTs in the Congruent future 
condition were significantly faster than RTs in the Incongruent condition (t21=-3.32, p = .003, 
r
2
=.34), the size of this difference was small relative to the duration of the trial (5 s) and the 
TR (3 s). Thus, it is unlikely that this RT difference affected any differences between the 
estimated HRFs of the two conditions.  
Phenomenological data are also presented in Table 1. In line with our manipulation, 
the within-sphere details comprising Congruent detail sets were rated as significantly more 
likely to co-occur than the across-sphere details comprising the Incongruent detail sets 
(t21=7.68, p < .001, r
2
=.74). The estimated temporal distances of Incongruent future events 
were slightly further from the present than Congruent events although this difference was not 
significant (t21=-1.81, p < .085, r
2
=.13) and the averages for both conditions were well within 
the 5 year limit imposed on participants. 
Future simulations constructed in the Incongruent condition were rated by participants 
as more difficult to construct (t21=-5.43, p < .001, r
2
=.58), less similar to previous events 
(t21=-5.91, p < .001, r
2
=.62), less plausible (t21=8.49, p < .001, r
2
=.77), and less detailed 
(t21=3.51, p = .002, r
2
=.37) than events in the Congruent condition. Moreover, the proportion 
of detail sets correctly remembered during the cued-recalled test was lower in the 
Incongruent condition (t21=6.28, p < .001, r
2
=.65).  
Finally, we computed correlations between AUT flexibility scores and each of the 
difference scores between Congruent and Incongruent condition (i.e., for each behavioral 
measure). These analyses revealed significant negative correlations of flexibility scores with 
difficulty (r = -.49, p = .02) and plausibility (r = -.53, p = .01) difference scores. While the 
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relationship between flexibility scores and detail difference scores was also negative, this 
effect was not significant (r = -.31, p =.16). Novelty and encoding difference scores were not 
correlated with flexibility scores (novelty r = 0.07, encoding r = 0.00; both p values > 0.70). 
3.2 Task PLS Results 
The non-rotated task PLS analysis examining Incongruent versus Congruent future 
simulations produced a significant latent variable (p < .001), showing distinct whole-brain 
patterns of activity associated with each future simulation condition across the temporal 
window (5 TRs). As shown in Figure 1, positive brain scores (weighted averages of activity 
across all voxels associated with each task) and positive saliences were associated with 
regions in which BOLD signal was greater in the Congruent condition, while negative brain 
scores and saliences were associated with regions in which BOLD signal was greater for the 
Incongruent condition. As shown in Figure 2, the number of voxels  responding to Congruent 
and Incongruent conditions varied across the temporal window, with the greatest number of 
significant voxels (thresholded at a BSR of ±3) showing a Congruent > Incongruent effect at 
TR 4 (9-12 s into the trial). Inversely, the TR in which the greatest number of voxels showed 
an Incongruent > Congruent effect was earlier in the temporal window (TR 2, 3-6 s into the 
trial). The effects at these maximal TRs are described in more detail below. Importantly, only 
those regions that are evident following the residualization of BOLD data for differences in 
all five behavioral dimensions (Section 2.5.4.2) are reported below so as to restrict our 
description of results to those regions showing effects independent of differences in behavior 
(see Section S3 for the results of the task PLS analysis computed on raw (i.e., unresidualized) 
BOLD data and clusters affected by each residualization procedure; see Figure S7 for a 
graphical depiction of the effect of the residualization procedure on activation).  
3.2.1 TR 2.  
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During TR 2 (3-6 s into the trial), the Incongruent condition was associated with 
increased BOLD responses relative to the Congruent condition in a number of regions that 
were largely outside the core network/DMN network (see Table 2A). Specifically, a number 
of regions in the SN were responsive to the increased constructive demands of the 
Incongruent condition. To interrogate these effects more closely, percent signal change 
values were extracted from peak voxels of selected clusters and plotted.   
The region in which the Incongruent > Congruent effect was the most robust was in 
the left anterior/mid insula (xyz -38 4 14). As shown in Figure 3A, the effect in this region 
was characterized by a relative reduction in deactivation for the Incongruent condition. That 
is, while both conditions resulted in a reduction in a BOLD signal in this region relative to the 
start of the trial, this deactivation was less marked for the Incongruent condition. Likewise, as 
shown in Figure 3B, the supramarginal gyrus showed a similar effect with the Incongruent 
condition exhibiting slight activation compared to the deactivation observed in the Congruent 
condition at this early point in the temporal window. Conversely, there were some clusters 
outside the SN (e.g. fusiform gyrus and subcallosal cortex, Figures 3C and D) that exhibited 
greater activations (i.e., positive percent signal change relative to the start of the trial) during 
the Incongruent relative to Congruent condition. Clusters in DMN regions (middle temporal 
gyrus, medial parietal and medial frontal cortices) showed increased activity in the Congruent 
condition at this time-point. In addition, a cluster in part of the SN, the right insula, showed 
reduced deactivation in the Congruent condition relative to the Incongruent condition.  
3.2.2 (TR 4).  
Contrary to our hypothesis, it was the Congruent condition that resulted in increased 
activation of the core network/DMN relative to the Incongruent condition (see Table 2D). A 
single, massive cluster of activation (> 10,000 voxels), with a peak voxel located in the left 
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cerebellum, extended bilaterally into medial parietal (retrosplenial cortex, posterior cingulate 
and precuneus) and medial temporal cortices. In addition, bilateral lateral temporal cortices 
and the right angular gyrus also showed this Congruent>Incongruent effect. As shown in 
Figure 4, percent signal change extracted from peak voxels of clusters showed that while both 
conditions recruited the DMN, this effect was significantly more pronounced for the 
Congruent condition. It is important to note that while the responses to the Congruent 
condition were greater in magnitude, most of these key DMN regions (shown in Figure 4) 
also showed reliable responses to the Incongruent condition (i.e. one-sample t-tests 
confirmed percent signal change values at TR 4 to be significantly different from zero; all p 
values < .02). The exception to this finding was in the left hippocampus, in which the 
Incongruent condition elicited percent signal change values that were not reliably different 
from zero (p > .09). In addition to the DMN, the Congruent condition also produced 
increased activation in some regions in the FPCN (e.g. right middle frontal gyrus, superior 
parietal lobule) and SN (e.g. right insula, bilateral precentral gyrus).  At this TR, a single 
cluster, located in the left insula showed a reliable Incongruent > Congruent effect; this 
cluster was the same locus of activity as the left insula cluster showing the same effect at 
TR2.  
3.3 Seed PLS – Left Insula  
We were interested in examining the functional connectivity of regions of interest in 
the FPCN (dorsolateral and rostrolateral prefrontal cortex) and SN (insula, anterior cingulate 
cortex) associated with the Incongruent condition, in line with previous reports of these 
regions coupling with the DMN during tasks that require increased cognitive flexibility 
(Beaty et al., 2015). The only one of these regions to exhibit an Incongruent > Congruent 
effect was the insula. Specifically, during both TRs 2 and 4, the left mid-anterior insula (xyz -
38 4 14) showed reduced deactivation during the Incongruent condition relative to the 
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Congruent condition. A mean-centered ws-seed PLS analysis on the Congruent and 
Incongruent conditions produced a significant LV (p < .005) indicating reliable whole-brain 
differences between the two conditions in functional connectivity with a 6mm
3
 ROI centered 
on the left mid-anterior insula (xyz -38 4 14). As shown in Figure 5, during the Incongruent 
condition the insula seed showed differential functional connectivity with two DMN regions: 
the left temporal pole (xyz -56 8 -30) and the right angular gyrus (xyz 50 -62 28) (see Table 
3). In addition, a cluster in the left parahippocampal gyrus (xyz -22 -26 -24) also showed the 
same effect, but failed to meet the chosen cluster size threshold of 10 voxels. The seed region 
did not show preferential functional connectivity to any regions in either the SN or the FPCN. 
During the Congruent condition, increased functional connectivity with the left insula seed 
was most prominent in a large bilateral prefrontal cluster (maximal in left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) that extended into the anterior cingulate cortex.  
3.4 Behavior PLS – Cognitive Flexibility 
A behavior PLS analysis using AUT flexibility scores was computed to identify 
regions in which activity during future simulation correlated with divergent thinking abilities 
– an index of cognitive flexibility. This analysis yielded a significant LV (p < .05) explaining 
70.46% of the crossblock covariance, revealing a set of brain regions linearly associated with 
AUT flexibility scores similarly for both future simulation tasks (see Figure 6). As for the 
task PLS analyses, we again restricted our description of results to the TR in which the 
greatest number of significant voxels was apparent: TR 3 in this case. During this time-
window, AUT flexibility scores showed reliable correlations—both positive and negative—
with BOLD signal in regions from various functional networks. As shown in Figure 7 and 
Table 4, AUT flexibility scores were positively associated with bilateral rostrolateral 
prefrontal cortices (xyz -20 62 10; 24 60 16), with these clusters extending into both the DMN 
and FPCN. Likewise, signal in the right temporal pole (DMN: xyz 52 4 -18) during the future 
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simulation tasks showed a positive association with AUT flexibility scores. Inversely, a 
cluster in the left hippocampus (DMN: xyz -30 -28 -16) was negatively associated with AUT 
flexibility scores. Lateral prefrontal cortices (FPCN: xyz -46 38 8; 46 44 12) as well as 
bilateral amygdalae (xyz -32 -4 -24; 30 0 -26) also showed a negative association with 
cognitive flexibility.     
4. Discussion 
The current study investigated the neural correlates of recombinatory demands during 
the flexible simulation of future events using two approaches. First, we experimentally 
increased recombinatory demands during the simulation process by manipulating the 
disparateness of episodic memory details comprising an imagined future scenario, and 
assessed changes in both mean BOLD signal (Task PLS) and functional connectivity (ws-
seed PLS) induced by this manipulation. Second, to determine if and how individual 
differences in cognitive flexibility relate to brain activity while imagining future scenarios, 
we performed brain-behavior correlations (Behavioral PLS) between flexibility scores from a 
divergent thinking task (AUT) and brain activity during future simulation.  
Given that the hippocampus has previously been characterized as a key structure 
involved in the recombination of memory details during episodic future simulation (Addis & 
Schacter 2012; Benoit & Schacter, 2015), we predicted that increasing the disparateness of 
memory details (and hence increasing the demand placed on recombinatory processes) 
during the Incongruent condition should be associated with increased hippocampal activity 
as compared with the Congruent condition. Instead, our results showed that the Congruent 
condition resulted in stronger activation in a number of key DMN regions, including the 
hippocampus. This is particularly surprising, as Weiler et al. (2010) reported that right 
anterior hippocampal activity increased linearly as the plausibility of events decreased. 
There are, however, important differences between the two studies. In our study, participants 
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were presented with three details that were to be integrated into imagined events, while 
Weiler et al. (2010) presented generic event cues (e.g. “Christmas dinner”). A consequence 
of this difference in experimental paradigm is that the episodic details retrieved and then 
recombined in the Weiler et al. study were internally generated, while our paradigm imposed 
additional constraints on the content of imagined scenarios. An effect of this manipulation 
was that the events in our study―even those in the Congruent condition―were rated as 
considerably less plausible than the events generated in the Weiler et al. study. This suggests 
that the linear relationship between plausibility and hippocampal activity observed in the 
Weiler et al. study may not hold for the entire spectrum of plausibility. Instead, extremely 
implausible events may be associated with decreased hippocampal activity (relative to less 
implausible events), as observed in the current study where hippocampal activity was 
reduced in the Incongruent condition. 
As the epoch in which the Congruent > Incongruent effect was greatest (9-12 s into 
the trial) corresponded to the elaboration phase of the imagined scenario (Addis et al., 2007), 
a plausible interpretation of the increased hippocampal activity during the Congruent 
condition is that it reflects increased episodic memory retrieval, rather than recombination 
demands: perhaps due to the strong episodic associations between the congruent details 
comprising these events, more episodic information was retrieved, contributing to the 
generation of more elaborate imagined scenarios (as confirmed by higher detail ratings for 
Congruent simulations). By this account, the related details act as strong cues for the 
hippocampus to retrieve additional memory details associated with the three presented 
details (i.e. pattern completion; McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Norman & 
O’Reilly, 2003). This proposal also bears resemblance to the notions of spreading activation 
(Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2001) and autobiographical memory chaining (Mace, 2014), 
whereby retrieval of autobiographical memories triggers the automatic activation or retrieval 
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of related memories. In addition, any increase in the number of memory details retrieved 
during the Congruent condition would also, necessarily, result in an increase in the 
recombinatory load associated with that condition, resulting in greater hippocampal activity. 
By this account, the recombinatory processes carried out by the hippocampus are determined 
not only by the novelty or disparateness of the memory details comprising an event (greater 
in the Incongruent condition), but also the number of details contributing the event (greater 
in the Congruent condition). Note also that this view is consistent with and indeed emerges 
from the multi-component model of hippocampal contributions to episodic future simulation 
put forth by Addis and Schacter (2012), which links the hippocampus with distinct 
components of future simulations, including both retrieval of episodic details and 
recombining those details.  
Although the Incongruent condition was associated with less activation of the 
hippocampus and other DMN regions relative to the Congruent condition, we did find that 
the Incongruent condition was accompanied by recruitment of SN regions earlier in the trial 
(TR 2), which was in line with our hypothesis. This effect of reduced deactivation was most 
prominent in the left mid-anterior insula, a region previously shown to be strongly 
associated with task difficulty and error-monitoring (Bastin et al., 2016; Eckert et al., 2009; 
Kosillo & Smith, 2010; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007; Tregellas, Davalos, & Rojas, 2006). 
That the effect in the left insula survives residualization for behavioral and 
phenomenological differences suggests, however, that this region plays an active role in the 
recombination of disparate autobiographical details as opposed to merely signaling shifts in 
task difficulty. The literature offers two potentially complimentary interpretations of the role 
of the insula in future simulation that are commensurate with our data. First, the insula has 
been shown to be integral to the detection and processing of salient information (Menon & 
Uddin, 2010; Uddin, 2015). This function is not restricted to a particular modality, 
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applicable to “odd-ball” targets in both visual and auditory domains (e.g. Linden et al., 
1999). Particularly relevant to the current study are a large number of studies showing, 
across a range of cognitive domains, that the insula is sensitive to experimental paradigms 
involving the matching of unexpected or incongruent stimuli. For example, Meyer, Greenlee 
& Wuerger (2011) have shown greater activation in the left anterior insula for incongruent 
audio-visual pairings (body movements and speech sounds) relative to congruent pairings. 
Likewise, a number of studies have shown insula involvement in the processing of 
incongruent word-color combinations during the Stroop task (e.g. Chen, Lei, Ding, Li, & 
Chen, 2013; van Veen & Carter, 2005), semantically incongruent word-pairs (van der 
Heiden et al., 2014) and the atypical stressing of syllables during speech perception 
(Rothermich & Kotz, 2013). Recently, Wakusawa et al. (2015) reported insula activation 
when imagining using novel tools, or using familiar tools in novel situations. Together, these 
studies suggest a domain-general function of insula processing that involves the detection of 
salient stimuli that deviate from sensory, perceptual or conceptual expectations. According 
to this framework, the left insula effect we report in the task-PLS analysis, in which the 
Incongruent condition resulted in greater activity than the Congruent condition, likely 
reflects the registering of unusual detail combinations presented in the Incongruent 
condition as salient.  
Interestingly, although the Incongruent condition produced increased activity in the 
left insula, the task PLS also produced the reversed effect in the right insula later in the 
temporal window, with greater BOLD signal associated with the Congruent condition. The 
reason for this discrepancy in effects in left and right insulae is unclear. The right insula has 
previously been shown to be involved in self-attributed evaluation of task-performance 
(Späti et al., 2014) and, given the phenomenological differences between the two conditions 
(e.g. difficulty, detail, plausibility), it is possible that the right insula activity in our task 
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corresponds to participants’ evaluation of their own performance on the simulation task. 
This is unlikely, however, as Späti et al. (2014) showed that self-attributed poor performance 
was associated with increased activity in the right insula, while in the current study the 
condition on which participants would have likely judged their performance as poor (i.e. the 
Incongruent condition) produced decreased activity. Resting-state functional connectivity 
studies have shown lateralized connectivity effects in the insula (Cauda et al., 2011; 
Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008), and further research is required to investigate how such 
lateralized functions are related to episodic simulation, as suggested by the current study.    
In addition to registering unexpected or incongruent stimuli, as a key node of the SN, 
a second key function of the insula is the initiation of the switch between activation of the 
DMN and FPCN (Menon & Uddin, 2010; Uddin, 2015). Furthermore, recent work has 
implicated the anterior insula in the dynamic coupling of these networks during creative 
tasks that require cognitive flexibility (e.g., divergent thinking tasks; Beaty et al., 2015, 
2016), with DMN regions initially showing connectivity with the insula early on in the task, 
before coupling with regions in the FPCN. Similarly, our ws-seed PLS results show that the 
trial-to-trial variability in the magnitude of the BOLD response in certain DMN regions is 
associated with the degree of deactivation in the left insula: those trials in which the angular 
gyrus and temporal pole respond maximally to the Incongruent condition are accompanied 
by the left insula “staying online”, but during trials when these regions are weakly engaged, 
the insula is strongly deactivated. During the Congruent condition, however, the left insula 
shows enhanced functional connectivity with regions in the FPCN and SN. These functional 
connectivity findings are interesting because, while previous research has focused on the 
SN’s role in switching between networks in response to externally-directed tasks that 
typically result in the suppression of the DMN (Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008; Uddin, 
2015), our findings suggest that the left insula is also capable of increasing DMN activity 
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when required during “salient internal thought” (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 
2014).  
To summarize, our findings suggest that the left insula plays an important role in both 
registering unusual memory detail sets as salient, as well as coupling with DMN regions to 
enable successful construction of imagined future events involving incongruent memory 
details. However, it should be noted that previous research has implicated an additional 
mechanism responsible for the switching between networks during autobiographical 
thinking: Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter (2010) found that it was the 
FPCN that flexibly switches from being coupled with the DMN and (in that study) the dorsal 
attention network depending on current task demands. However, although their task was 
autobiographical, it required participants to engage in long-term planning rather than to 
construct future simulations. Thus, taken together with our findings, it would appear that the 
mechanisms associated with changes in network coupling vary depending on specific 
experimental contexts and forms of autobiographical thinking.   
Motivated by previous behavioral work highlighting the relationship between episodic 
future simulation and divergent thinking (Addis et al., 2016; Madore, Addis, & Schacter, 
2015; Madore, Jing, & Schacter, 2016), we explored whether our behavioral and BOLD 
variables were associated with this form of cognitive flexibility (as measured by the AUT 
flexibility scores). Our results revealed that AUT flexibility scores were negatively correlated 
with Congruent-Incongruent difference scores for both plausibility and difficulty ratings. 
This finding suggests that more flexible individuals are less affected by the increasing 
recombinatory demands associated with the Incongruent condition, providing further 
behavioral evidence for the link between divergent thinking and episodic simulation. 
Additionally, our behavior PLS analysis showed that brain activation during both conditions 
was linearly associated with AUT flexibility scores in a number of DMN and FPCN regions. 
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Specifically, clusters in bilateral rostrolateral prefrontal cortices (extending into both the 
DMN and FPCN) showed positive correlations with flexibility scores, demonstrating that 
cognitively flexible individuals recruit these regions during future imagination to a greater 
degree than less cognitively flexible individuals. Rostrolateral prefrontal cortex has been 
associated with a diverse range of cognitive domains, including mentalizing, episodic 
retrieval and working memory (Gilbert et al., 2006), suggesting that it carries out domain-
general processes (Wendelken, Chung, & Bunge, 2012). A large body of research has also 
implicated the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex in relational integration, reasoning, and the 
evaluation of self-generated thought (Christoff et al., 2001; Ellamil et al., 2012; Green, 
Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010; Wendelken & Bunge, 2009; Wendelken et al., 
2012; Wendelken, Nakhabenko, Donohue, Carter, & Bunge, 2007; Westphal, Reggente, Ito, 
& Rissman, 2016). Thus, we propose that when completing an episodic simulation task in 
which participants are provided with specific details to integrate together, the rostrolateral 
prefrontal cortex may support the generation and evaluation of reasons for the co-occurrence 
of episodic details that have not occurred together in the past – and that cognitively flexible 
individuals recruit this region to a greater degree, thereby providing a more plausible context 
for their imagined scenario. This form of relational reasoning relies not merely on the 
retrieval of episodic memories but also on semantic information (e.g., schemas), thereby 
providing a plausible “semantic scaffolding” to guide the simulation of a novel yet coherent 
event (Irish et al., 2012; Irish & Piguet, 2013).  
Indeed, the behavior PLS analysis also showed that activity in the right lateral 
temporal pole—a region strongly associated with the representation of semantic information 
(Bonner & Price, 2013; Lambon Ralph, Pobric, & Jefferies, 2009; Lambon Ralph, Sage, 
Jones, & Mayberry, 2010) , including autobiographical semantic information (Graham, Lee, 
Brett, & Patterson, 2003)—was also positively correlated with cognitive flexibility. 
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Interestingly, anterior temporal regions also showed increased functional connectivity to the 
left insula during the Incongruent condition. In addition, the right angular gyrus, which has 
been shown to exhibit greater coupling with medial temporal lobe regions during 
autobiographical memory retrieval relative to rest (Bellana, Liu, Anderson, Moscovitch, & 
Grady, 2016), and has been linked with semantic processing (Binder et al., 2009; Price, 
Bonner, Peelle, & Grossman, 2015; Seghier, 2013), also exhibited preferential connectivity to 
the insula during the Incongruent condition. Together these results suggest that, in addition to 
more flexible recruitment of semantic regions during future imagination, decreasing the 
congruence of memory details comprising an imagined event is associated with increased 
coupling of the insula to DMN regions mediating semantic processing. 
Although activity in the rostrolateral prefrontal and temporopolar cortices was 
positively correlated with AUT flexibility scores during simulation, there were also a number 
of regions that exhibited negative relationships with cognitive flexibility. Most surprising of 
these regions was the left hippocampus—a region previously implicated in both future 
simulation (Addis & Schacter, 2012; Benoit & Schacter, 2015) and flexible, creative thinking 
(Duff, Kurczek, Rubin, Cohen, & Tranel, 2013; Ellamil et al., 2012; Rubin, Watson, Duff, & 
Cohen, 2014). Given that rostrolateral prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus are both 
involved in relational processing (Wendelken & Bunge, 2009), it is possible that one’s 
individual level of cognitive flexibility influences the strategy adopted during the task. 
Specifically, it may be that individuals with lower cognitive flexibility engage the 
hippocampus to form more concrete, contextual relations between disparate episodic details 
while highly flexible individuals link episodic details in a meaningful way by engaging in 
higher-level autobiographical reasoning, via operations in the rostrolateral prefrontal and 
temporopolar cortices, to generate a framework in which novel scenarios can occur.   
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Another possibility is that the negative association between left hippocampal activity 
and AUT flexibility scores is due to highly flexible individuals being able to inhibit the 
automatic, hippocampally-mediated retrieval of episodic details (i.e., pattern completion) 
during the construction of future events, and instead restrict retrieval to only those details 
consistent with task demands. Indeed, it has been shown that one of the key components to 
generating novel responses in the AUT is the ability to inhibit the activation of memory 
details directly associated with a cue, thereby avoiding obvious responses (Beaty & Silvia, 
2012). According to Beaty and Silvia, the automatic retrieval of memories and concepts 
directly related to the AUT cue interferes with the ability to generate novel and creative 
responses. Thus, with respect to the current study, it could be the case that the automatic 
retrieval of details directly related to the cues in the recombination paradigm interferes with 
the generation of novel scenarios. One feature of the current data that supports this proposal 
is that the relationship between AUT flexibility scores and simulation-related activity in the 
left HC evident in the behavioural PLS was driven by the Congruent condition (r = -.577, p = 
.005) when the automatic retrieval of episodic details is likely greater (given the provided 
detail are related), while this relationship was not significant for the Incongruent condition (r 
= -.225, p = .314).   
In addition to a negative relationship with the left hippocampus, AUT flexibility 
scores were also negatively correlated with bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortices and 
amygdalae. We have previously reported amygdala activation when employing versions of 
this recombination paradigm (Addis, Pan, et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2011), and have 
attributed this activity to novelty processing related to unusual detail sets (van Mulukom et 
al., 2013) . The finding that this novelty signal is negatively correlated with cognitive 
flexibility suggests that more flexible individuals experience these simulations as less unusual 
or bizarre. This interpretation is supported by the finding that increasing divergent thinking 
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ability was associated with smaller differences in plausibility ratings between Congruent and 
Incongruent conditions – a result that indicates that more flexible individuals rated the future 
events they constructed from incongruent details as more similar in plausibility to the future 
events based on congruent details.  
While episodic future simulation has generally been regarded as a process subserved 
by increased activation in the core network/ DMN, we have used multivariate analysis 
techniques to show that increasing the relational demands associated with future imagination 
results in reduced recruitment of key DMN nodes, increased activation in areas within the SN 
and increased functional connectivity between SN and DMN regions. In addition, individual 
differences in cognitive flexibility covary with engagement of regions in both the FPCN and 
DMN during episodic simulation, highlighting the complex interaction of these networks 
during forms of flexible cognition (Beaty et al., 2015, 2016; Ellamil et al., 2012; Spreng et 
al., 2010), including imagination of personal future scenarios.   
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Figure 1. Average brain scores for future simulation conditions. Brain scores are 
weighted averages of activity across all voxels associated with each task. Error bars are 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2. Results of the task PLS analysis comparing Congruent and Incongruent future 
simulation conditions. Images of activation at TRs 2-5, thresholded using a bootstrap ratio 
of ±3.00 (equivalent to p < .001) and an extent threshold of 10 voxels, superimposed on a 
standard anatomical template. Warm saliences correspond to areas associated with the 
Congruent condition and cool saliences with the Incongruent task.  
 
Figure 3. Incongruent > Congruent Task PLS results in selected regions of interest. 
Regions showing an Incongruent > Congruent effect (negative saliences/cool colors) at TR 2: 
(A) Left insula (xyz -38 4 14); (B) left supramarginal gyrus (xyz -64 -26 18); (C) left fusiform 
gyrus (xyz -30 -62 -10); and (D) right subcallosal cortex (xyz 6 30 -12). Images are 
thresholded using a bootstrap ratio of ±3.00 (equivalent to p < .001) and an extent threshold 
of 10 voxels, and are superimposed on a standard anatomical template. Plots show percent 
signal change (extracted from peak voxels) for each future simulation condition as a function 
of TR.  
 
Figure 4. Congruent > Incongruent Task PLS results in selected regions of interest. 
Default mode network regions showing a Congruent > Incongruent effect (positive 
saliences/warm colors) at TR 4: (A) left cerebellum (xyz -38 -54 -22); (B) right precuneus 
(xyz 12 -62 20); (C) left temporal pole (xyz -46 16 -26); (D) left temporal pole (xyz -62 -10 -
10); (E) left parahippocampal gyrus (xyz -28 -24 -20); and (F) left hippocampus (xyz -32 -24 -
12) Images are thresholded using a bootstrap ratio of ±3.00 (equivalent to p < .001) and an 
extent threshold of 10 voxels, and are superimposed on a standard anatomical template. Plots 
show percent signal change (extracted from peak voxels) for each future simulation condition 
as a function of TR.  
 
 
Figure 5. Within-subject seed PLS results. (A) A significant latent variable indicated that 
functional connectivity with the left mid-anterior insula seed (xyz -38 4 14) differed 
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according to future simulation condition. Regions with negative saliences (cool colors) 
exhibited an Incongruent > Congruent effect, and included (B) right angular gyrus (xyz 50 -
62 28) and (C) left temporal pole (xyz -56 8 -30). Regions with positive saliences (warm 
colors), such as (D) left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (xyz -50 30 26), exhibited a Congruent 
> Incongruent effect. Images are thresholded using a bootstrap ratio of ±3.00 (equivalent to p 
< .001) and an extent threshold of 10 voxels, and are superimposed on a standard anatomical 
template. Plots show seed-voxel correlations (extracted from peak voxels) for each future 
simulation condition.  
 
Figure 6. Behavior PLS results. This plot depicts the correlation profile for a significant 
latent variable showing correlations between AUT flexibility scores and brain scores during 
Congruent and Incongruent conditions.  
Figure 7. Behavior PLS results. Correlations of Alternate Uses Task flexibility score for 
Congruent and Incongruent conditions with BOLD signal from selected regions of interest: 
(A) Left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (xyz -20 62 10); (B) right rostrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (xyz 24 60 16); (C) left hippocampus (xyz -30 -28 -16); (D) right temporal pole (xyz 52 
4 -18); (E) left inferior frontal gyrus (xyz -46 38 8); (F) right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(xyz 46 44 12); (G) left amygdala (xyz -32 -4 -24); (H) right amygdala (xyz 30 0 -26). Images 
are thresholded using a bootstrap ratio of ±3.00 (equivalent to p < .001) and an extent 
threshold of 10 voxels, and are superimposed on a standard anatomical template. PSC = 
percent signal change; AUT = Alternate Uses Task flexibility scores; Cong = Congruent 
condition; Incong = Incongruent condition 
 
 
Table 1. Behavioral and Phenomenological Measures for Future Simulation and Control 
Conditions 
 
Mean (SD) 
Control 
Condition 
Congruent Future 
Condition 
Incongruent 
Future Condition 
Number of trials
*
 44 (3) 39 (4) 34 (7) 
Reaction Time (s)
 *
 4.01 (0.90) 4.93 (1.11) 5.12 (1.18) 
Likelihood of co-occurrence
*†
  n/a 1.00 (0.42) 0.42 (0.26) 
Temporal distance (years) n/a 1.53 (0.44) 1.66 (0.63) 
Difficulty
*†
 n/a 0.93 (0.39) 1.24 (0.45) 
Similarity to previous events
*†
 n/a 0.70 (0.48) 0.38 (0.38) 
Plausibility
*†
 n/a 1.20 (0.46) 0.61 (0.31) 
Detail
*†
 n/a 1.65 (0.34) 1.51 (0.37) 
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Subsequent cued-recall 
(proportion correct) 
n/a .60 (.16) .48 (.20) 
Note. 
†
Rating scale (0-3) where 0 = low, and 3 = high. *Significant difference between conditions (p < 
.001). SD, standard deviation; s, seconds. 
 
 
Table 2. Task PLS results: Negative and positive saliences associated with the 
Congruent and Incongruent future simulation conditions  
Structure Coordinates (MNI) BSR Cluster 
size (k) x y z 
(A) Incongruent > Congruent (TR 2) 
Default Mode Network 
   R Subcallosal Cortex 6 30 -12 -4.26 33 
Salience Network 
   L Insula -38 4 14 -6.40 53 
   L Supramarginal Gyrus -64 -26 18 -4.33 29 
Other Regions  
   R Cerebellum 48 -74 -24 -4.65 213 
   L Middle Temporal Gyrus -44 -46 6 -4.36 19 
   L Cerebellum -46 -76 -26 -4.07 60 
   L Frontal Orbital Cortex -20 28 -20 -4.07 47 
   L Fusiform Cortex -30 -62 -10 -4.04 10 
(B) Congruent > Incongruent (TR 2) 
     
Default Mode Network      
   L Paracingulate Gyrus -12 42 -2 4.37 16 
   R Middle Temporal Gyrus 56 -2 -22 4.26 21 
   R Precuneus/Posterior Cingulate Cortex 2 -54 26 3.53 11 
Salience Network      
   R Insula 40 14 -4 3.67 24 
Other Regions      
   R Occipital Pole 28 -98 -14 4.99 11 
   L Cerebellum -18 -46 -22 4.27 64 
   L Middle Temporal Gyrus -40 -60 12 4.11 25 
(C) Incongruent > Congruent (TR4) 
     
Salience Network      
   L Insula -34 4 14 -3.82 10 
(D) Congruent > Incongruent (TR 4) 
          
Default Mode Network 
   L Cerebellum -38 -54 -22 9.92 10841 
   extends into: R Precuneus 12 -62 20 7.07  
                         L Parahippocampal Gyrus -28 -24 -20 4.58  
                         R Parahippocampal Gyrus 28 -24 -18 4.08  
                         L Hippocampus -32 -24 -12 4.04  
   R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 58 -34 -26 6.63 549 
   L Middle Temporal Gyrus -48 -24 -8 6.05 876 
   extends into: L Temporal Pole -62 -10 -10 4.89  
   L Temporal Pole -46 16 -26 5.48 152 
57 
 
   R Superior Parietal Lobule/Angular Gyrus 28 -50 52 4.91 391 
   R Temporal Pole 56 12 -24 4.70 21 
   R Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 -8 -20 4.43 101 
   R Frontal Pole 52 36 2 4.38 18 
   L  Inferior Temporal Gyrus -46 -4 -36 4.23 97 
   R Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 2 -32 3.88 31 
Frontoparietal Control Network 
   L Superior Parietal Lobule -18 -62 50 5.81 1300 
   R Middle Frontal Gyrus 36 26 20 4.32 10 
   R Middle Frontal Gyrus
D
 54 14 40 4.25 248 
   L Middle Temporal Gyrus -66 -56 -4 3.89 62 
Salience Network 
   L Supplementary Motor Cortex -4 6 54 5.49 396 
   R Insula
D
 34 16 10 5.08 353 
   R Supramarginal Gyrus 42 -44 22 4.97 28 
   L Precentral Gyrus -8 -20 46 4.85 55 
   R Precentral Gyrus 58 4 14 4.47 197 
   R Superior Frontal Gyrus 12 0 76 4.43 780 
   R Insula 38 0 6 3.78 17 
   R Insula 42 -10 6 3.56 13 
Other Regions 
   L Thalamus -6 -18 0 5.94 86 
   L Precentral Gyrus -42 -12 54 5.35 1584 
   R Lateral Occipital Cortex 44 -68 -6 4.93 107 
   L Cerebellum -10 -46 -50 4.91 183 
   R Temporal Pole 40 26 -34 4.80 20 
   L Parahippocampal Gyrus -20 2 -34 4.64 56 
   R Cerebellum 10 -42 -42 4.57 44 
   L Precentral Gyrus -40 6 24 4.42 38 
   R Thalamus 12 -18 14 4.25 108 
   R Superior Frontal Gyrus 20 -10 72 4.13 27 
   R Postcentral Gyrus 52 -18 44 4.13 33 
   L Lateral Occipital Cortex -28 -84 30 4.01 108 
   L Occipital Pole -14 -96 -2 3.96 172 
   L Lingual Gyrus -6 -40 4 3.90 95 
   R Parahippocampal Gyrus 20 -6 -26 3.88 19 
   R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 48 -14 -42 3.42 11 
Note. Bootstrap ratios were greater than ±3.00 (roughly equivalent to p-value <.001) and an extent threshold of 
10 voxels was applied. k = number voxels comprising a cluster. 
D 
Greater than 20% of cluster extended into 
default mode network.
 
BSR, bootstrap ratio; L, left; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; R, right.  
 
 
Table 3. ws-seed PLS results: Negative and positive saliences exhibiting functional 
connectivity with the left insula during the Congruent and Incongruent conditions 
Structure 
Coordinates 
(MNI) BSR 
Cluster 
size (k) 
x y z 
(A) Incongruent > Congruent  
Default Mode Network 
   L Temporal Pole -56 8 -30 4.13 24 
   R Angular Gyrus 50 -62 28 3.76 37 
Other Regions 
   R Cerebellum 14 -46 -16 4.00 72 
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   R Temporal Pole 32 6 -28 3.96 17 
   L Cerebellum -16 -62 -44 3.68 14 
   R Cerebellum 12 -68 -40 3.64 24 
   L Cerebellum -8 -68 -34 3.46 19 
(B) Congruent > Incongruent  
Default Mode Network 
   R Superior Frontal Gyrus 2 44 46 -5.28 2671 
   Medial Prefrontal Cortex 12 48 -8 -3.61 22 
Frontoparietal Control Network 
   L Middle Frontal Gyrus
D
 -50 30 26 -7.02 9188 
   L Frontal Pole -28 44 -10 -6.31 252 
Salience Network 
   R Precentral Gyrus 56 8 28 -3.66 22 
   L Anterior Cingulate  Cortex
F
 -2 -4 34 -3.54 17 
Other Regions 
   R Caudate 16 16 20 -6.70 141 
   L Precentral Gyrus -36 -2 34 -5.07 32 
   L Caudate -16 10 10 -5.04 751 
   R Lateral Occipital Cortex 48 -82 18 -4.31 14 
   L Caudate -16 26 2 -3.89 19 
   B Medial Prefrontal Cortex 0 36 -26 -3.83 13 
   R Lateral Occipital Cortex 28 -58 48 -3.77 13 
   L Supramarginal Gyrus -44 -34 36 -3.48 20 
Note. Bootstrap ratios were greater than ±3.00 (roughly equivalent to p <.001) and an extent threshold of 10 
voxels was applied. k = number voxels comprising a cluster. 
D 
Greater than 20% of cluster extended into default 
mode network.
 F 
Greater than 20% of cluster extended into frontoparietal control network. B, bilateral;
 
BSR, 
bootstrap ratio; L, left; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; R, right. 
 
 
Table 4. Behavior PLS results: Negative and positive saliences correlated with Alternate 
Uses Task flexibility scores  
 
Structure 
Coordinates (MNI) 
BSR 
Cluster 
size (k) x y z 
(A) Positively correlated with AUT flexibility scores (TR 3) 
Default Mode Network 
   L Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex
F
 -20 62 10 4.64 155 
   R Superior Temporal Gyrus/Temporal Pole 52 4 -18 4.46 121 
   R Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex
F
 24 60 16 4.24 115 
   R Superior Frontal Gyrus 22 18 42 3.76 14 
Frontoparietal Network 
   R Lateral Occipital Cortex
 
 24 -84 48 6.60 117 
   R Superior Frontal Gyrus 30 -4 64 4.13 33 
Salience Network  
   L Paracingulate Gyrus -12 10 42 3.62 14 
Other Regions 
   L Cerebellum -6 -62 -26 7.59 1341 
   L Superior Frontal Gyrus -20 -2 50 5.73 103 
   L Thalamus -10 -34 12 5.63 52 
   L Superior Parietal Lobule -30 -58 60 5.56 35 
   L Precuneus -30 -60 6 5.47 129 
   R Superior Frontal Gyrus 24 0 48 5.23 56 
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   L Occipital Pole -38 -94 0 4.67 37 
   R Cerebellum 26 -56 -24 4.60 77 
   R Intracalcarine Cortex 30 -60 2 4.57 136 
   R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 56 -26 -30 4.43 10 
   R Lateral Occipital Cortex 36 -82 0 4.26 54 
   R Postcentral Gyrus 54 -12 38 3.82 27 
   R Caudate 16 12 18 3.58 16 
   L Parahippocampal Gyrus -18 -32 -16 3.51 18 
   R Cerebellum 14 -36 -20 3.35 12 
(B) Negatively correlated with AUT flexibility scores (TR 3) 
Default Mode Network 
   L Hippocampus -30 -28 -16 -5.80 17 
Frontoparietal Network 
   L Middle Frontal Gyrus -50 14 44 -4.45 36 
   L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -46 38 8 -4.41 21 
   R Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex 46 44 12 -3.95 33 
Salience Network  
   L Insula -40 4 -8 -3.99 14 
Other Regions 
   R Postcentral Gyrus 56 -16 54 -5.65 28 
   L Amygdala -32 -4 -24 -5.33 18 
   R Amygdala 30 0 -26 -3.90 10 
   R Parahippocampal Gyrus 16 2 -24 -3.89 14 
Note. Bootstrap ratios were greater than ±3.00 (roughly equivalent to a p-value of <.001) and an extent threshold 
of 10 voxels was applied. k = number voxels comprising a cluster. 
F 
Greater than 20% of cluster extended into 
frontoparietal control network.
 
AUT, Alternate Uses Task; BSR, bootstrap ratio; L, left; MNI, Montreal 
Neurological Institute; R, right. 
 
Highlights 
 Future imagination requires binding disparate memory details in novel combinations 
 The disparateness of memory details contributing to imagined events was manipulated 
 Increased disparateness resulted in decreased DMN and increased insula activity 
 It also produced increased coupling between the insula and nodes of the DMN 
 Differences in cognitive flexibility affect imagination-related brain activity 
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